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I. INTRODUCTION
The proliferation of international courts and tribunals alias, the
multiplicity of international judicial forums, is one of the topical issues in
international law. This development in the realm of international dispute
settlement comes, according to Phillipe Sands, at the fourth phase in the
development of international adjudication. International disputes prior to
1899 were adjudicated almost exclusively between States, with some
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exceptions. I For instance, the mixed tribunals established pursuant to the
Jay Treaty of 1794 between the U.S. and Great Britain allowed for
individual claims to be brought before the tribunal. The move to the second
phase came with the decision in 1899 to establish the Permanent Court of
Arbitration (PCA), which was done "with the objective of facilitating an
immediate recourse to arbitration for international differences" that could
not be settled by diplomacy.2  The permanent nature of the PCA makes
recourse possible at all times as opposed to setting up new institutions as
incidents arise.3 Even if the PCA is not considered a permanent tribunal
with permanent judges, it is regarded as an important point in the history of
modern international dispute settlement. 5  A truly 'international' court
would have had to wait until the end of World War 1.6 The third phase in
the history of international adjudication commenced in the 1940s and 1950s
with the establishment of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the
European Court of Justice (ECJ), the European Commission and Courts of
Human Rights. This phase lasted up to the early 1980s, and encompassed
also the establishment of the International Centre for the Settlement of
Investment Disputes (ICSID). The fourth phase as Sands argues was
decisively initiated by the creation of the International Tribunal for the Law
of the Sea (ITLOS). Although the ITLOS became operational in 1996 the
adoption of the 1982 Convention for the Law of the Sea signaled an entry in
* LL.B (Addis Ababa Univ.), LL.M (Univ. of Pretoria.), LL.M (Kyushu Univ.), PhD
Candidate (The University of Hong Kong). Credits are due to Suzannah Linton, Associate
Professor and Director of the LL.M Program in Human Rights Law, University of Hong Kong
for her comments on the early draft of this paper.
1. E.g., Treaty of Amity. Commerce and Navigation. U.S.-Gr. Brit., Nov. 19, 1794.
available at http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage?collId=llsl&fileName=008/lls1008.db&rec
Num= 129 (establishing mixed tribunals consisting of members appointed by Great Britain and
the U.S. and an impartial umpire to decide claims by nationals of each State).
2. Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes. Jul. 29. 1899. art.
20, available at www.pca-cpa.org/ENGLISH/BD/BDEN/I 899ENG.pdf. [hereinafter CPSID].
3. Id.
4. Permanent Court of Arbitration, http://www.pca-cpa.org/ENGLISH/GI/#History
(last visited Oct. 3. 2006) (the PCA was established by the Convention for the Pacific
Settlement of International Disputes for resolving disputes between states).
5. The original purpose was not accepted. On this point, "T.M.C. Asser of the
Netherlands expressed his dissatisfaction in the following way: 'instead of a Permanent Court,
the Convention of 1899 only created the phantom of a Court, and impalpable ghost, or, to
speak more plainly, it created a clerk's office with a list.'" P.H. Kooijmans, International
Arbitration in Historical Perspective: Past and Present, Comments on a Paper by Professor
L.B. Sohn, in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: PAST AND PROSPECTS 23 (A.H.A. Soons ed..
1990).
6. Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ), Overview,
http://www.indiana.edu/-league/ pcijoverview.htm (last visited Sept. 26. 2006) (Permanent
Court of International Justice established under auspices of the League of Nations in 1920);
see also Central American Court of Justice. http://www.worldcourts.com/cacj/eng/index.htm
(last visited Sept. 26, 2006) (Central American Court of Justice functioned between 1907-
1918).
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to a new phase. This phase is characterized by compulsory jurisdiction and
the granting of binding decision making power to judicial institutions, as is
now also reflected in the provisions of the WTO's Dispute Settlement
Understanding (DSU). In this last phase the creation of the International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea provoked a lot of debate among scholars,
judges and practitioners. One of the outspoken commentators against its
establishment was Judge Shigeru Oda of the ICJ who believed that the work
of the ITLOS could be perfectly handled by the ICJ without a need for the
establishment of a new tribunal.'
Put in context, this proliferation of international courts and tribunals
has to be seen as a part of the greater picture of the proliferation of
international organizations. This in turn needs to be seen in the context of a
growing interdependence between countries and international cooperation
that necessitates an institutional mechanism to regulate these new areas of
cooperation. According to Blokker, "there is one fundamental overarching
explanation that is usually summarized in catch words such as globalization
and interdependence" and which effectively means that "an increasing
number of state functions can no longer be performed in splendid
isolation."8 Hence globalization has its own share in the creation of more
international courts and tribunals.
In most cases, the proliferation of international organizations directly
contributed to the proliferation of international courts and tribunals. For
instance, the proliferation of administrative tribunals and those tribunals
created under the auspices of regional integration agreements are some of
such cases. This development is what Georges Abi-Saab characterizes as a
law of legal physics, where "to each level of normative density, there
corresponds a level of institutional density necessary to sustain the norms".
9
While the need for new courts could be justified by the creators in each
case, the fact that they are attached to international organizations instead of
standing alone is explained more by economic justifications than other
considerations. As Hugh Thirlway notes, from the experiences of PCIJ and
ICJ, the "most practical method of financing a tribunal is through the budget
of an international organization, thus tapping the purses of member States
7. Shigeru Oda. The International Court of Justice viewedfrom the Bench (1976-
1993), in 244 RECUEIL DES COURS: COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 9 (1993-VII); but see Jonathan I. Charney, Editorial Comment, The
Implications of Expanding International Dispute Settlement Systems: The 1982 Convention on
the Law of the Sea, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 69 (1996).
8. Niels M. Blokker, Proliferation of International Organizations: An Exploratory
Introduction, in 37 PROLIFERATION OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS. LEGAL ISSUES 1. 11
(Niels M. Blokker & Henry G. Schermers eds., 2001).
9. Georges Abi-Saab. Fragmentation or Unification: Some Concluding Remarks, 31
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 919. 925 (1999); see also YUVAL SHANY. THE COMPETING
JURISDICTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 3 (Ruth Mackenzie & Cesare
Romano Philippe Sands eds., 2003).
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who may not be interested in contributing to an international judiciary as
such." 10
While the above general statements could apply to the whole
phenomenon, it is also important to look for specific reasons that are often
invoked for the creation of multiple international courts and tribunals. How
do we go about it? One appropriate question that could be raised is why
States create many more new international tribunals instead of strengthening
the "principal judicial organ" of the United Nations? That calls for the
examination of what Lauterpacht calls "historical" and "functional" reasons
underlying the proliferation.11 Further, as Rao reminds us, these additional
tribunals are not created wantonly. The need for their establishment is
carefully considered and the state representatives who lobby for these
tribunals are conscious of the need to avoid duplicating the efforts or
supplanting the stature of the ICJ. 12 Thus, in the following sections I will
focus on these specific reasons. It is not the purpose of this short essay to
examine the implications of the proliferation of international judicial forums
on the integrity of public international law. 13
At the same time, in addition to the unsuitability of the ICJ for the
needs of some countries, there are other reasons responsible for the creation
of alternative judicial forums. These include, among others, the fact that
there have been some fundamental changes in international law and
relations, and the success of some courts as an inspiration for the creation of
more courts. I will also discuss the reasons that underlie the preference for
ad hoc and quasi ad hoc judicial forums over the permanent forums as this
development characterizes the multiplicity of forums.
10. Hugh Thirlway, The Proliferation of International Judicial Organs: Institutional
and Substantive Questions, The International Court of Justice and Other International Courts,
in 37 PROLIFERATION OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, LEGAL ISSUES 251, 255 (Niels
M. Blokker & Henry G. Schermers eds., 2001).
11. ELIHUJ LAUTERPACHT, ASPECTS OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF INTERNATIONAL
JUSTICE 14-15 (1991).
12. See Pemmaraju Sreenivasa Rao, Multiple International Judicial Forums: A
Reflection of the Growing Strength of International Law or Its Fragmentation, 25 MICH. J.
INTL L. 946 (2004).
13. See generally Bruno Simma, Fragmentation in a Positive Light, 25 MICH. J. INTL
L. 845 (2004); Gerhard Hafner, Pros and Cons Ensuing From Fragmentation of international
Law, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 849 (2004); Gilbert Guillaume, Advantages and Risks of
Proliferation: A Blueprint for Action, 2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 300 (2004); Martti Koskenniemi
& Paivi Leino, Fragmentation of International Law? Postmodern Anxieties, 15 LEIDEN J.
INTL L. 553 (2002); Thomas Buergenthal, Proliferation of International Courts and
Tribunals: Is It Good or Bad?, 14 LEIDEN J. INTl L. 267 (2001); Benedict Kingsbury,
Foreword: Is the Proliferation of International Courts and Tribunals a Systemic Problem?, 31
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 679 (1999); Georges Abi-Saab, Fragmentation or Unification:
Some Concluding Remarks, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 919 (1999); Pierre-Marie Dupuy,
The Danger of Fragmentation or Unification of the International Legal System and the
International Court of Justice, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 791 (1999).
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11. WHY NOT PROMOTE THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AS A SOLE
JUDICIAL FORUM?
A. Historical Reasons
The historical argument often advanced is an obvious one and is most
commonly cited. A representative argument is made by Elihu Lauterpacht,
who writes that "the use of other means of third-party settlement had been
an established feature for nearly a century and a half before the PCIJ was
brought in to existence in 1920." 14 He briefly narrates the history of
international adjudication starting with the Jay Treaty and a number of
mixed arbitral tribunals and mixed claims commissions that were
implemented before and after the First World War. To illustrate, he cites
several high profile cases that found their way to arbitral tribunals instead of
the International Court of Justice. 15 There is no doubt that these tribunals
functioned alongside the short lived Central American Court of Justice, the
Permanent Court of International Justice, and later with the International
Court of Justice. It is also true that arbitration clauses will continue to be
part of new treaties to be negotiated as an important means of dispute
settlement. But is it the same thing as the inflationary tendency we see
today in the number of standing international courts and tribunals?
It is possible to argue that the arbitral tribunals view their role as one of
resolving the particular dispute at hand without feeling the need to
pronounce a law for the international community. But at least permanent
courts like the ICJ perceive their role as entities involved in the process of
the progressive development of international law.
Arbitration tribunals are also perceived as resolving disputes based on
both legalistic and non-legalistic methods.16  In principle, both arbitral
14. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 11, at 14. See also Article 21 of the 1899 Hague
Convention for the Pacific Settlement of international Disputes. which provides "[t]he
Permanent Court shall be competent for all arbitration cases, unless the parties agree to
institute a special Tribunal." CPSID. supra note 2. at art. 21 (meaning Member States could
by agreement take their dispute to forums other than the Permanent Court of Arbitration).
15. Id. at 10-11 ("a fisheries dispute between France and Canada; land boundary
disputes between Egypt and Israel, Argentina and Chile and India and Pakistan; maritime
boundary dispute between Guinea and Guinea-Bissau, iceland and Norway, Argentina and
Chile, and between France and Britain; a dispute relating to the destruction of the Rainbow
Warrior between New Zealand and France; the interpretation of two air service agreements
between France and the United States: disputes between Portugal and Liberia and between
Ghana and Portugal about the application of the ILO Abolition of Forced Labour Convention;
a dispute concerning the use of waters of Lac Lanoux between France and Spain; a dispute
relating to a denial of justice between Greece and the United Kingdom; a dispute relating to
the rate of exchange applicable to an intergovernmental financial agreement between Greece
and the United Kingdom; a dispute within UNESCO relating to eligibility for re-election to
the Executive Board; and a dispute relating to gold looted by Germany from Rome").
16. Manfred Lachs, Arbitration and International Adjudication. in INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION: PAST AND PROSPECTS 37, 41 (A.H.A Soons ed., 1990) ("some arbitral
[Vol. 10:2
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tribunals and permanent courts can decide ex aequo et bono, based on the
consent of the parties. But the flexibility attached to the establishment and
operation of arbitral tribunals gives the impression that they are more
disposed to decide cases on ex aequo et bono than the permanent courts.
This may be a reason why their jurisprudence attracts less attention and
scrutiny. The fact that these tribunals are low profile and do not attract
much attention, and that their proceedings are often held in camera, has
enabled them to live peacefully alongside with permanent tribunals.
Further, when these tribunals existed along side the permanent
tribunals, most of the arbitrators were selected from the former or serving
judges of the PCIJ or ICJ who would ensure that their determination was in
consonance with that of the judicial institution to which they were
affiliated.' 7  The fact that these arbitral tribunals work outside an
institutional framework means that they are not expected to jealously guard
or assert an institutional independence like is evident in some standing
international tribunals. In some of the standing tribunals it has been
observed that there is a tendency that "each institution speaks its own
professional language and seeks to translate that into a global Esperanto, to
have its special interests appear as the natural interests of everybody." '
8
There is also a difference between the nature of adjudication and
arbitration and the perception associated with both methods of dispute
settlement mechanisms in terms of their outcomes. Compared to the awards
of arbitral tribunals, the decision of a permanent judicial body like the TCJ is
said to have the following three advantages. 19 First, an award given by such
an organization wields great authority. 20  This is probably because of the
ICJ's position as the most senior and principal judicial organ of the United
Nations. Second, an award greatly contributes to the "development of a
permanent and uniform jurisprudence." Finally, "one is certain to avoid any
difficulties which might arise in the case of and at the time of constituting
tribunals, even in the modern context, do not have to be guided solely by law): but see I.
Brownlie, Arbitration and International Adjudication, Comments on a Paper by Judge M.
Lachs, in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: PAST AND PROSPECTS 55, 58 (A.H.A. Soons ed.,
1990) ("1 regard arbitration in the twentieth century as essentially the same process as
adjudication.").
17. Kingsbury, supra note 13 at 682 ("[T]he law of maritime boundaries is unusual,
however: the dialogue has been mainly between the ICJ and ad hoc arbitral tribunals, some of
which have contained serving or former ICJ judges; this is one of the very few areas in which
the ICJ has thought fit to cite any tribunal other than itself...
18. Koskennienmi & Leino, supra note 13, at 578.
19. Official Documents, Permanent Court of Arbitration Circular Note of the
Secretary General, 54 AM. J. INT'L L. 934 (1960).
20. Id.: but see Brownlie, supra note 16, at 59 ("It pains me to offer different views to
those of Judge Lachs. but I was not persuaded that it is obvious that the authority of decisions
of courts of arbitration is different, that is to say less, than the decisions of a permanent
tribunal").
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the body which will settle the dispute." 2 1 In light of what we are discussing
here the first two reasons are very important and indicate why the parallel
existence of arbitration did not and will not pose a serious problem that
affects the coherence of international law. At least as the perception and the
precedent value goes, states attach more importance to the decisions of the
Permanent tribunals than ad hoc arbitration awards. The third reason is
relevant when one looks at the practical difficulties involved in setting up
arbitral tribunals.
Even within the framework of the United Nations Charter, the
International Court of Justice, dubbed the "principal judicial organ" of the
United Nations, is not the sole judicial organ, and states may still enjoy a
"free choice of means for the resolution of their disputes." 22  "States may
entrust the solution of their difference to tribunals other than the ICJ by
virtue of agreements already in existence or which may be concluded in the
future."
,23
B. Functional Reasons
1. Burden of work on the International Court of Justice
Lauterpacht writes that "if States were to submit all their justiciable
disputes to the ICJ, that tribunal would be unable to cope with the burden of
the work." 24 It is a fact that the ICJ, given its resources, may not efficiently
and quickly respond to the demands of its clients. 25  This problem is
compounded as a result of the ICJ's practice of sitting as a full bench of
fifteen judges which contributes to the delay in handing down rulings.26
But Lauterpacht himself doubts if States take the ICJ's workload into
account in making the decision to create new courts or take their case to
another one.2
Nevertheless, the ICJ is taking a series of measures to simplify its
procedures and make it more accessible to the State parties. 28 In the Report
21. Id. These difficulties could consist of the time, effort and resources put into
negotiating a treaty that establishes a new tribunal every time a dispute needs judicial
settlement.
22. Manila Declaration on the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes art. 1, 3,
art. II, 5, March 18, 1982, 21 I.L.M. 449.
23. Id. at art. 11, 5.
24. LAUTERPACHT, supra note I1, at 15.
25. International Court of Justice, Report of the International Court of Justice, 38,
255 (2005), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/igeneralinformation/igeninf Annual
Reports/iicj annual report 2004- 2005.pdf. (The annual budget of the 1CJ is less than one
percent of the total budget of the United Nations).
26. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 11. at 16. The 1CJ introduced chambers but that did not
attract much interest and had problems in its operations.
27. Jd. at 15-16 n. 46.
28. International Court of Justice, supra note 25. at 37.
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of the International Court of Justice 2004-05, the President of the ICJ
indicated that in December 2000, the Court revised certain provisions of its
Rule and adopted various Practice Directions as of October 2001.
Moreover, the Court also welcomed co-operation from certain parties to
cases who have taken steps to reduce the number and volume of written
pleadings, in addition to the length of their oral arguments, and who in some
cases even provided the Court with pleadings in both of its official
languages. 29 In July 2004, the Court adopted further measures, primarily
regarding its internal functioning and provided practical methods for
increasing the number of decisions rendered each year; thereby, shortening
the period between the closure of written proceedings and the opening of
• 30
oral proceedings. This revision of rules by the Court to make itself more
"customer friendly" is a good gesture in itself, yet it needs to be
complemented by the efforts of the member States of the United Nations
who could amend the Statute of the Court and provide it with more funds.
2. Composition of the International Court of Justice
References have also been made to the composition of the ICJ as a
factor inducing States to look for other venues for the settlement of their
disputes even if it means creating new ones.3 1 This kind of reasoning is not
confined to a particular group of countries. Most traditional grouping of
states the eastern bloc, developed and developing countries had at
different times invoked the composition of the ICJ as a factor adversely
affecting their reliance on ICJ as a principal forum of choice. This is
invoked in any one of the following ways.
The ICJ's composition is limited to fifteen judges. 32 In principle, an
ICJ judge could be appointed from any member state of the United
Nations.33 In practice, however, nationals of the five permanent members
of the United Nations Security Council are routinely elected.3 4 There is
also the established practice of what might be called special "reserved" seats
that are, by apparent common consent, earmarked (allocated) for the new,
de facto Big Powers of today, such as India and Japan.3 5 Hence, few
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See generally LAUTERPACHT, supra note 11, at 15-17.
32. STATUTE OF INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, art. 3, (June 26, 1945), available
at http://www.icj- cij.org/icjwww/ibasicdocuments/ibasictext/ibasicstatute.htm#CHAPTER-1
[hereinafter I.C.J. STATUTE].
33. See Cesare P.R. Romano, International Justice and Developing Countries: A
Qualitative Analysis (Continued). 1 THE LAW & PRAC. OF INT'L CTS. & TRIBUNALS 539, 578
n. 145 (2002).
34. Id.; PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST'S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO
INTERNATIONAL LAW 282 (7t' ed. 1997).
35. Edward McWhinney. Law, Politics and "Regionalism" in the Nomination and
Election of World Court Judges, 13 SYRACUSE J. OF INT'L L. & COM. 1, 11 (1986).
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positions are left for judges from other States. This very fact itself may
have had some influence over the decision to establish new tribunals. 36 It is
likely that States would look for judges on the Bench with whom they could
identify. This is not mitigated by the fact that a State appearing before the
ICJ could apply for the appointment of an ad hoc judge in case it does not
have its citizen sitting on the ICJ as a judge unlike its opponent. 37
This same apprehension also finds expression under the veil of
regionalism. In this regard, Lauterpacht points to the observable fact that a
number of States are reluctant to submit a matter which directly affects them
to the decision of judges, most of whom have no connection with the region
in which a dispute originates and some of whom one or the other side
• 38
believes-rightly or wrongly-to be politically unsympathetic. This is
inspired by the desire to solve local problems locally in a tribunal that fully
understands the context, the background, and other factors unique to the
region. In this regard one notes the famous controversy between Latin
American Countries and the TCJ regarding the issue of regional custom on
Asylum Cases. 39 But, the regional prejudice is very capricious as it may be
invoked either ways. For instance, it is possible that the controversy in
question involves the vital interests of the majority of States in the region or
some of the states are involved in the problem in certain capacities. In such
cases it is a good idea to put a tribunal in charge, which is detached from the
region so as to avoid the problem of bias. Sir Robert Jennings cites the
dispute between Argentina and Chile in the Beagle Channel case where both
parties in principle agreed not to include a "Latin American" in the
Arbitration. 41 The feeling was then that any Latin American may take sides
in this very well known and debated dispute between Chile and Argentina.
4 2
However, the award by the arbitral tribunal failed to settle the dispute. A
possible reaction to the failure of the Beagle Channel arbitration occurred in
1991 when Argentina and Chile submitted a dispute concerning the Laguna
del Desierto area to an arbitral tribunal which was composed exclusively of
Latin American judges.43
36. Rao, supra note 12, at 946.
37. I.C.J. STATUTE, supra note 32, at art. 31; Romano, supra note 33 at 580 n.155.
Both parties to a dispute may also apply for the appointment of ad hoc judge if they do not
have their national sitting on the ICJ.
38. LAUTERPACHT, supra note I1, at 17.
39. But in some cases it is said that the ICJ had managed to handle similar cases
coming from the same region, for instance the case between Honduras and El Salvador, see
Robert Y. Jennings, The Proliferation of Adjudicatory Bodies: Dangers and Possible
Answers, 9 ASIL BULL No. 9, 442 (1995)
40. See generally Jennings, supra note 39.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Romano. supra note 33. at 580.
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There is also a perception that some ICJ judges come from States in
which the independence of the judiciary is exceptional and that those same
States, in addition to others, have never been prepared to litigate their
disputes in the Court. 44 This is a charge labeled against both countries of
the eastern block and developing countries. In the countries of the eastern
block, for ideological reasons, the independence of the judiciary as a
concept developed by the western liberal democracies is not accepted. Most
developing countries, in addition to being the satellites of the USSR, lacked
the necessary legal infrastructure and political will to promote judicial
independence domestically which, according to the west, deprives them the
moral ground to have their citizens appointed to the "world court". Further,
big states like China, USSR/Russia, Japan, Poland, Brazil, and Argentina,
who had judges on the ICJ bench, never appeared before the Court.
With the end of the Cold War, this claim is increasingly unfounded as
witnessed by an increasing resort to the court. Even then, when one
compares the actual number of judges coming from this block with that of
those coming from Western Europe and the Americas, their ability to sway
the decision of the court is miniscule. Furthermore, Edward McWhinney
rejects the belief that was commonly held in the past in certain Western
political circles that there is anti-western voting majority on the court.45 In
1986, McWhinney observed that there was no automatic anti-western voting
majority in the ICJ.4 6 According to him, "the fact remains that no one
group or block, even if it succeeded in imposing a national unity and
marshalling all its votes on a particular issue, could command a judicial
majority without engaging in major bridge-building and forming a coalition
with other regional group's members."
47
This perception is misguided and a rhetoric to a certain extent as
Malanczuk notes the fact that although some states are not prepared to
appear before international tribunals either as plaintiffs or defendants, this is
not necessarily caused by the desire to be able to break international law
with impunity. 48 Nor, one may add, are judges hailing from such countries
which are known to show prejudice against cases concerning their
ideological adversaries.
Judges from third world countries are suspected of representing a
"cultural background which tends to favour a drastic change in the
substance of traditional rules to bring them in to line with present-day needs
44. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 11, at 17 n.49; see also Christian Tomuschat, Settlement
of Disputes, in I ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 92, 98 (Rudolf Dolzer et
al. eds., 1981).
45. McWhinney, supra note 36, at 15.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. MALANCZUK, supra note 34, at 103.
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of less developed countries. ' 49  Hence, countries that uphold the more
legalistic approach hesitate to bring disputes before the Court.50 But do
third world countries in the General Assembly of the United Nations abuse
their voting power and block nominees from the Western countries?
McWhinney concludes that this is not true. According to him, reason and
empirical studies on the record of judicial elections show there is no
organized and systematic "ganging-up" against western candidates by the
new third world majority in the U.N. General Assembly. 5 1  This is
notwithstanding the fact that third world issues dominate the agenda of the
General Assembly.
In conclusion, whether such perceptions are correctly held or not, there
is no doubt that countries have at different times used this as a pretext for
avoiding determination by the ICJ. Eventually, it is such perceptions that
influence policies that determine the fate of international institutions.
3. Lack of Specialist Knowledge
The other obvious reason given for establishing new international
courts and tribunals is the need for a specialized forum that is more capable
of disposing specialized and technical legal issues. That means general
forums like the ICJ are not well conversant with these technical and
specialized issues. This argument is more pronounced in the areas of
human rights and trade laws.53  Nevertheless, the argument is not
automatically accepted. For instance, Lauterpacht wonders how technical a
legal issue could get and argues that ICJ has adequately decided cases
dealing with delimitation of both maritime and land boundaries. 54 This is in
reference to the establishment of the International Tribunal for the Law of
the Sea, which was designed to deal with, among others, the issue of the
delimitation of maritime boundaries. The fact that ICJ might be called upon
to decide cases in an emerging area of international law for which there is
no precedent may make its work more onerous but it does not make it
impossible. This is because new courts will have to also grapple, like the
ICJ, with the new legal principles that have never been tested.
Nonetheless, the case for specialized tribunal is stronger where it can
be foreseen that there will be a number of cases with similar issues, decided
over a relatively short period of time, and in which the knowledge gained in
49. Tomuschat, supra note 44, at 98.
50. Id.
51. McWhinney, supra note 36, at 16.
52. See e.g., LAUTERPACHT, supra note 11. at 17: SHANY. supra note 9. at 4.
53. Human rights is not a technical area of law, but it is argued that it is a specialized
branch of law whose interpretation is not amenable to the practice of treaty interpretation by
the ICJ, which is more conservative.
54. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 11. at 17. One may also add that the 1CJ has dealt with
several human rights cases so far both in its contentious and advisory opinion proceedings.
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deciding one case will be directly relevant in deciding other such cases."
Thus, it is justified to establish claims commissions to deal with cases that
arise from the same events. Even for the sake of expediency, a tribunal that
deals with very similar cases can dispose of the cases more efficiently. But
an important concession must be made that no matter how learned the
judges of the ICJ are, they cannot be experts in all of the ever-expanding
and emerging fields of international law.
States also choose to establish and utilize the services of specialized
tribunals, which tend to be smaller and, therefore, cheaper and more
expedient than the procedure used before larger courts like the ICJ.
56
Furthermore, the more specialized a tribunal, the more it offers the
opportunity for control over the outcomes of the proceedings.
57
4. Lack of Trust
It is also asserted that a lack of trust in the ICJ as an impartial forum by
a group of countries has contributed to the desire to push for alternative
forums for the settlement of their disputes. This group, in particular,
consists of the newly independent countries. The landmark decision that
defined the relationship between the ICJ and these newly independent
nations for the decades ahead was that of the South West Africa case
Second Phase.58 This case was brought by Ethiopia and Liberia, objecting
to South Africa's extension of its apartheid polices to its mandate territory,
South West Africa (now Namibia).5 9  In the Second Phase of the South
West African case (1966), ICJ's President at the time, Australian Sir Percy
Spender, had cast the second tie breaking vote resulting in a court majority
which led to the dismissal of the case filed by Ethiopia and Liberia for their
lack of legal right or interest in the case. 60 This decision was widely
interpreted in the General Assembly of the United Nations as a legal
sanction for the continuance and extension of Apartheid in Southern Africa
and thus an application of a "White Man's" law. 61 Consequently, for two
more decades, countries from the developing world were shunned away
from the ICJ.
Developing countries were not the only ones that felt disappointed by
the rulings of the ICJ. The United States' position in the Nicaragua case is
one prime example. In that case, the U.S. felt that the ICJ was biased
against it which led to the United States' withdrawal of its recognition of the
55. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 11, at 18.
56. See MALANCZUK. supra note 34. at 103.
57. See id.
58. Second Phase (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. S. Afr.), 1966 I.C.J. 6 (July 18).
59. Id.
60. Romano, supra note 33, at 585 n.168. By eight votes to seven the Court found that
it had jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the merits of the dispute.
61. McWhinney, supra note 36. at 16.
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Court's optional jurisdiction clause. 62 Admittedly, even if it is difficult to
establish a more direct link between the dissatisfaction of the States on the
ICJ, it is difficult to rule out the possibility that the negotiation and the
establishment of the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea is not
prompted by the mood that prevailed in those days.
Rao summarily dismisses the disenchantment with the decisions of the
ICJ as an insignificant reason because disenchantment with outcomes is not
unique to the ICJ or to judicial tribunals in general; rather, disenchantment
is a common consequence of most permanent institutional bodies. 63 This is
rather an understatement of the impact that the South West African case had
on the prestige and acceptability of the ICJ. The reasoning also
underestimates what a perception of bias could mean for the legitimacy of a
judicial institution, which is the principal judicial organ of the United
Nations as compared to the decisions of political institutions.
64Nevertheless, today the docket of the ICJ is at its busiest stage. Judge
Shi Jiuyong, the former President of the ICJ, recently said that "[w]hereas in
the 1970s, the Court had very few cases on its docket, and from 1990 to
1997 it had between nine and 13, the number of cases before the Court has
oscillated between 21 and 25 in recent years." 65 There are indications that
presently most of the clients of the ICJ are developing countries and in
particular there is an increasing resort to the court by African countries.
66
One also must mention the increase in the number of States that made the
optional declaration recognizing the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ after
1990 according to Article 36 Paragraph 2 of its statute. 67  This is a
62. Romano. supra note 33. at 588-89 n.182.
63. Rao, supra note 12. 945-46.
64. Rosalyin Higgins, Respecting Sovereign States and Running a Tight Courtroom, 50
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 121, 123 (2001).
65. J. Shi Jiuyong, former President of the ICJ., Lunch Time Talk at the University of
Hong Kong, The Contribution of the International Court of Justice to the Peaceful Settlement
of International Disputes (Dec. 2004), http://law.hku.hk/download/SpeechbyJudgeShiJiuyong
.PDF.
66. For an empirical study on the use of international courts and tribunals by
developing countries in general, see Cesare P.R. Romano, International Justice and
Developing Countries: A Quantitative Analysis. 1 LAW & PRAC. INT'L CTS. & TRIBUNALS
367 (2002); on the qualitative aspect, see also Romano. supra note 33.
67. International Court of Justice, Declarations Recognizing as Compulsory the
Jurisdiction of the Court, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ibasicdocuments/ibasicte
xt/ibasicdeclarations.htm; see also I.C.J. STATUTE, supra note 32, at art. 36, 2 (As of
December 2004, of the declarations made by 66 countries, the following 25 were made after
1990: Australia (22 March 2002), Bulgaria (24 June 1992), Cameroon (3 February 1994),
Canada (10 May 1994). Cote D'lvoire (29 August 2001), Cyprus (3 September 2002).
Djibouti (2 September 2005), Estonia (21 October 1991), Georgia (20 June 1995). Greece (10
January 1994), Guinea (4 December 1998), Hungary (22 October 1992), Lesotho (6
September 2000), Madagascar (2 July 1992), Nauru (9 September 1992), Nigeria ( 30 April
1998). Norway (25 June 1996). Paraguay (25 September 1996), Peru (7 July 2003). Poland
(25 March 1996), Portugal (25 February 2005), Slovakia (28 May 2004), Spain ( 29 October
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significant change. For instance, the acceptance by Yugoslavia of the ICJ's
compulsory jurisdiction yielded a number of cases filed against the
members of the NATO States for their roles in the armed conflicts in the
Balkans.
111. STRUCTURAL CHANGES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS
A. Erosion of the Concept of State Sovereignty
It is has become trite to say that the concept of state sovereignty is
being eroded in favor of more inclusive international law. Classical
international law had states only as its subjects or main actors. Many of the
international courts and tribunals that determine claims, such as the ICJ, are
not accessible to non-state actors even though the case involves these actors
in different capacities.
Yet, the erosion of the Westphalia model of international law has made
68it possible for non-state actors to creep in to the stage. Particularly some
treaties adopted in the realm of human rights 69 and international economic
law 70 make it possible for individuals or generally non-state entities to bring
their claims before pre-constituted tribunals. To this effect, the ICTY in a
Tadic case declares that a state-sovereignty approach [of international law]
has been gradually supplanted by a human being oriented approach. 7'
Although this approach may be regarded as signifying the unique nature of
international human rights, humanitarian and criminal laws, it also implies
the move from state responsibility to that of the more realistic individual
responsibility and recognition of the fact that individuals are bearers of
rights in concrete terms.
Traditionally, since groups of people do not have standing before an
international tribunal under international law, the only available means for
non-state actors to bring a claim before an international court has been when
the individual, group, or organization is able to persuade a state to bring a
1990). United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (5 July 2004), Yugoslavia (26
April 1999)).
68. Gerhard Hafner, Should One Fear the Proliferation of Mechanismsbfor the Peaceful
Settlement of Disputes?, in REGLEMENT PACIFIQUE DES DIFFERENDS ENTRE FIATS:
PERSPECTIVES UNIVERSELLE ET EUROPEENNE [THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES
BETWEEN STATES: UNIVERSAL AND EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES] 36 (Lucius Caflisch ed.
1998).
69. E.g., The European Court of Human Rights, the Human Rights Committee (a quasi
judicial body).
70. E.g., The Iran-US Claims Tribunal, the UN Compensation Commission and the
European Court of Justice, the International Centre for the Settlement of investment Disputes.
71. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the Defense Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction (Oct. 2, 1995).
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claim on their behalf. In other cases, however, a mandate state, like in the
case of Portugal in East Timor, may bring an action on their behalf 2 Or,
the General Assembly may seek advisory opinions on behalf of peoples who
could not be represented, as in the case of the advisory opinion on Western
Sahara and more recently on the legal consequences of the construction by
Israel of the fence/wall inside the Occupied Territories. When a State
espouses its citizens' claims, it is not the individual right that is being
asserted; rather, it is the right of the state itself.73 Unlike the standing of
individuals before international tribunals which has improved over the
years, the standing of groups of peoples before international tribunals still
has a way to go.
The ICJ statute reflects the Westphalia model which limits its access to
these states and some international organizations. As it is, the Statute
reflects the international law conception that prevailed in the 1920s when
the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) was
adopted. Thus, a relative change in the structure of international law over
the years in terms of its actors has necessitated the establishment of other
international courts and tribunals that could respond to the changed
situation. In that regard, in addition to the various human rights courts that
allow individual standing, 74 there are instances in which a non-state actor
could be a party to a dispute before the International Tribunal for the Law of
the Sea75 or the International Centre for Investment Disputes.
7 6
B. End of the Cold War
Many of the changes in the international sphere owe their source to a
global change that ensued in the late 1980's and early 1990's. Before I go
to what concerns us, by way of reminiscence, Michael Reisman succinctly
summarizes the state of affairs before the Cold War in the following words:
"At the height of the Cold War, there were two worlds on the planet,
between which trade and other human contact were drastically reduced. In
many ways, there were two systems of international law and two systems of
72. Case Concerning East Timor (Port. v Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. 90 (June 30).
73. Mavromamatis Palestine Concessions Case (Greece v U.K.), 1924 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A)
No. 2, at 12 (Aug 30); see also Panevezys-Saldutiskis Railway Case (Estonia v. Lithuania
Case), 1939 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A/B)No. 76.
74. For an example on Individual applications, see Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 34. Apr. 11, 1950, Europ. T.S. No. 5.
75. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982. art. 291(2), 1833
U.N.T.S. 397 (provides that the dispute settlement procedures under the convention is open to
entities other that States under certain circumstances).
76. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals
of Other States art. 1(2), Mar. 18, 1965, 17.1 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 (providing, "The
purpose of the Centre shall be to provide facilities for conciliation and arbitration of
investment disputes between Contracting States and nationals of other Contracting States in
accordance with the provisions of this Convention").
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world public order. ' ' 77 It is obvious that dispute settlement mechanisms too
have suffered from the consequences of this bipolarity.
It is often said that the end of the Cold War heralded "greater
commitment to the rule of law in international relations, at the expense of
power-oriented diplomacy." 78  It is also credited for "the easing of
international tensions, which had hampered in the past the growth of
adjudicative [processes]."' 7  The end of cold war created a platform for
negotiation and stepping up of efforts towards better international
cooperation. There are certain steps that were taken in that direction. For
instance, one of the main goals of the United Nations Decade of
International Law (1990-99), proclaimed by the General Assembly, is the
promotion of methods for the peaceful settlement of disputes including
resort to the International Court of Justice. 80  Likewise, the non-aligned
countries supported by Russia also called for the Third Hague Peace
Conference at the end of the decade (one hundred years after the First
Hague Peace Conference, which was initiated by the Tsar of Russia at that
time).81 Even if this Conference did not take place, it was hoped that it
would consider a new universal convention for the peaceful settlement for
disputes. 82 In 1992, the UN Secretary General's 'Agenda for Peace' also
pushed for reliance by States on the world court for settlement of disputes in
addition to a preventive diplomacy.
83
In terms of the number of judicial institutions created, not less than ten
of them have come to being as a direct or indirect consequence of the end of
the bipolarity. 84 The following developments are cited as examples: 8 5 the
establishment of the ICTY, which was made possible as a result of the
consensus within the Security Council; the creation of a similar tribunal,
77. W. Michael Reisman, International Law After the Cold War. 84 AM. J. INT'L L.
859, 859 (1990).
78. SHANY, supra note 9, at 3-4. However, according to Judge Rosalyn Higgins, "The
upturn in recourse to the Court [The International Court of Justice] began in the first half of
the 1980s, several years before the arrival of glasnost and perestroika. Many former colonial
States who had achieved their independence in the early 1960s had by the 1980s begun to see
that international law served their own ends as much as those of the developed countries."
Rosalyn Higgins, International Law in a Changing International System, 58(1) CAMBRIDGE
L.J. 79, 80 (1999).
79. SHANY. supra note 9. at 4.
80. United Nations Decade of International Law, G.A. Res. 44/23. 2(b), U.N. Doc.
A/RES/44/23 (Nov. 17, 1989).
81. MALANCZUK, supra note 34, at 301.
82. Id., at 301.
83. The Secretary-General. Report of the Secretary-General on an Agenda for Peace-
Preventative Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping, 38-39, delivered to the
Memhers of the United Nations. U.N. Doc. A/47/277 (June 17. 1992).
84. Cesare P.R. Romano, The Proliferation of International Judicial Bodies: The
Pieces of the Puzzle, 31 N.Y.U. J. INTl L. & POL. 709, 729 (1999).
85. Id. at 729-732.
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i.e., the ICTR, in response to the Genocide in Rwanda; the 1994
restructuring of the European Court of Human Rights as a consequence of
the expansion of the Council of Europe after the Cold War; the
establishment of the ITLOS after twelve years of dormancy; and the
establishment of the Central American Court of Justice.86 Of course, the
establishment of the International Criminal Court is attributable to a large
extent to none other than the end of the Cold War.
The end of the Cold War also contributed to the proliferation of
regional integration agreements as a result of the triumph of market
economy over its rival. Every region of the globe now claims its fair share
in the number of regional integration agreements along with dispute
settlement mechanisms, albeit with various degrees of efficiency and
activity. The most successful dispute settlement mechanism established
within the framework of the regional integration agreements is the European
Court of Justice followed by the NAFTA dispute settlement body to which
Canada, USA and Mexico are current members. The less active or dormant
mechanisms include: Benelux Economic Union Court (1974); European
Nuclear Energy Tribunal OECD (1957); Western European Union Tribunal
(1957); Economic Court of the Commonwealth of Independent States
(1993); Common Court for Justice and Arbitration of the Organization for
the Harmonization of Corporate Law in Africa (1997); Court of Justice of
the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (1998); Economic
Community of West African States Tribunal (1975); Judicial Board of the
Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (1980); Court of
Justice of the Economic Community of Central African States (1983); Court
of Justice of the Arab Mahgreb Union (1989); Court of Justice of the
African Economic Community (1991); Southern Africa Development
Community Tribunal (1992); Court of Justice of the Andean Community
(1984); Central American Court of Justice (1994); and Caribbean Court of
Justice (2005). In addition, more courts are being proposed along similar
lines.
87
In summary, as predicted by Michael Reisman in 1990, "[t]he need for
international law after the Cold War will be more urgent than it was during
the conflict. In many ways, what is expected of international law will be
86. These countries are Costa Rica, El Salvador; Guatemala, Honduras, Panama and
Nicaragua. it culminated in the establishment of the Sistema de la Integrasion
Centroamericana (SICA). The integration agreement among others establishes the Central
American Court of Justice.
87. For instance, the International Islamic Court of Justice, the Arab court of Justice,
the MERCOSUR Court of Justice, and the Inter-American Court of International Justice.
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greater." 88 That process will continue as there appears to be an appetite for
additional international courts and tribunals.
89
IV. SUCCESS OF SOME REGIONAL COURTS AS AN INSPIRATION
Shany argues that "the positive experience with some international
courts . . . (e.g., The Court of Justice of the European Communities (ECJ)
and the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR)) . . . has inspired the
creation of similar bodies." 90 One of the regions where such inspiration has
had some impact is the South American countries where the European Court
was perceived by its South American admirers as "providing for a
community legal order, and guaranteeing uniform interpretation of treaties
and other community acts."' 91 In the area of economic integration, sub-
regional efforts have been taken towards that goal. The establishment of
MERCOSUR (Mercado Comun del Sur), i.e., the Common Market for the
South; and SICA (Secretaria de lntegraci6n Centroamericana), i.e. the
Secretariat for the Integration of Central America, exemplify some of these
efforts. The strongest influence of the European system is felt in the human
rights field where the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and
Commission are inspired by their European counterparts, despite the fact
that the Inter-American Court does not allow for direct access by an
individual.92
Additionally, in Africa, there has been conscious effort to draw
inspiration from the European and the Inter-American experience. In the
human rights field, the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights
and the newly established African Court of Human Peoples' Rights 93 also
derive their inspiration from the European and the Inter-American Model.
94
The African Union is yet another bold attempt at emulating the European
88. Reisman, supra note 77. at 866.
89. The need for the establishment of an International Human Rights Court has always
been discussed and it is waiting for the right time to come. The regional integration
agreements also have more promise for additional dispute settlement bodies.
90. SHANY. supra note 9. at 4.
91. Rosalyn Higgins. The ICJ, the ECJ and the Integrity of International Law. 52 1NT'L
& COMp. L.Q., 1, 13 (2003).
92. Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights art.
61(1). Nov. 22. 1969. O.A.S.T.S. No. 36. 1144 U.N.T.S. 123.
93. See Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People's Rights on the
Establishment of an African Court of Human Rights, Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, June 10,
1998, OAU/LRG/AFCfIPR/PROT(Ill) (entered into force Jan. 25, 2004), available at
http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/Documents/Treaties/ Text/africancourt- humanrights.pdf.
94. However, the earlier Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community which
did provide for an African Court of Justice lapsed before the court was put into place, see
Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community. June 3, 1991. art. 18, available at
http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/Documents/ Treaties/Text/AECTreaty_199 l.pdf.
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Union with similar institutions including the African Court of Justice. 95 It
is, however, important to mention the recent decision taken by the African
Union Assembly of Heads of State held in July 2004 to merge the African
Court of Human and Peoples' Right and the African Court of Justice. 9 6 It
appears that the decision to merge these two courts was prompted by
financial and logistical reasons, as well as the apparent competence of both
courts to adjudicate human rights issues, rather than the desire to coherently
apply international law. 9 7  This decision raises several issues of
implementation given the unique nature of these two courts. 98  The
modalities of merging these two courts is still under review, and the African
Commission on Human and Peoples' Right has already expressed its deep
concern given the fact that many states have yet to ratify the instrument
establishing the African Court of Justice while the one for the African Court
of Human and Peoples' Right has already entered in to force. 99  In the
meantime, the Executive Council of the African Union, which is composed
of the foreign ministers of the member states, have decided to allow the
human rights court to become operational notwithstanding the continuing
discussion on the merger. 100  This is the first global attempt to lessen the
inflationary tendency in the creation of international courts and tribunals but
95. Protocol to the African Charter, supra note 92 at 4; Protocol of the Court of
Justice of the African Union Maputo, Mozambique (II July 2003) available at
http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/Documents/Treaties/Text/Protocol /20to/2Othe o2OAfri
can%20Court0/o2 0 of%20Justice0/o2 O-0/o20Maputo.pdf.
96. Assembly of the African Union, 3d Ordinary Sess., Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, July 6-
8, 2004, Assembly/ AU/Dec./45 (II), 4.
97. Submission to the African Union by The Coalition for an Effective African Court
on Human & Peoples' Rights, Legal and Institutional Issues Arising from the Decision by the
Assembly of Heads of State & Government of the African Union to Integrate the African Court
on Human and Peoples' Rights and the Court of Justice of the African Union (October 2004),
available at http://www.african courtcoalition.org.
98. Id. The substantive integration unlike administrative integration raises issues that
could only be addressed by amending the constitutive instruments of both courts. For
instance, the African Court of Human Rights is a treaty body while the African Court of
Justice is an organ of the African Union; therefore, the merger should take that into account
and introduce an amendment to the respective instruments. Further, both courts interpret
different instruments with a possible overlap which also needs to be addressed given the fact
that while the Court of Justice is not accessible to individuals, a human rights court is. The
merger also raises questions with respect to the number of judges as well as the manner of
appointment and removal from office in a newly merged court. The difference in approach to
the enforcement of the decisions of both courts also warrants the overhauling of the direction
to be taken by the merged courts. This by itself is a new and time consuming project that
could lead to a protracted negotiation in the amendment process.
99. African Commission on Human and People's Rights [ACHPR], Resolution for the
Establishment of an Effective African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights, ACHPR/Res. 76
(XXXVII)05 (May 11, 2005), available at http://www.achpr.org/english/resolutions/resolutio
n81 en.html.
100. Executive Council of the African Union, Decision EX.CL/Dec. 165 (VI), January
2005, available at http://www.africa-union.org/Summit/jan2005/Executiveo20Council/Execu
tive%20Council/o20-Decisions /20-Dec /%20165-191-Abuja.doc.
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not necessarily prompted by the desire to achieve the coherent application
of international law. Nevertheless, it is to be seen in the future whether the
merged court is able to efficiently handle cases, which in Europe are
handled by two different courts based in Strasbourg and Luxembourg. It
will certainly serve as a test case for the much called for unification or
coordination of international courts and tribunals.
V. PREFERENCE FOR AD HOC DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
A. Introduction
At present, ad hoc and quasi ad hoc dispute settlement mechanisms
play a significant role. Among the many are the long running Iran-US
Claims Tribunal (since 1981), 101 the United Nations Compensation
Commission (UNCC), 102 the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia
(ICTY) (since 1993), the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(ICTR) (since 1994), and more recently the Ethio-Eritrean Boundary and
Claims Commissions. 03 It is evident that most of these tribunals took
longer than their intended life-time. This aspect prompted Judge Thomas
Buergenthal to comment on Iran-US Claims Tribunal, stating that it "has
proved that if you want to create a truly permanent international court, all
you need to do is to establish an ad hoc tribunal and expect it to finish its
work in less than two years." 
04
As noted in the preceding sections, some of the reasons why States opt
out of permanent standing dispute settlement procedures could well be
because of a preference for ad hoc dispute settlement mechanisms. For
instance, the need for control over the procedures, specialization, cost
considerations, etc., could prompt states to choose the more expedient ad
101. The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal was established as one of the measures
taken to resolve the crisis between the United States of America and Iran which began in
November 1979, following the detention of fifty-two US nationals at the US embassy in
Tehran and subsequent freeze of the Iranian assets by the US.
102. The United Nations Compensation Commission was established by the United
Nations Security Council as its subsidiary organ in 1991. Its mandate is to process claims and
pay compensation for losses and damage suffered as a direct result of the Iraqis' unlawful
invasion and occupation of Kuwait.
103. The Ethiopian-Eritrean Boundary and Claims Commission were established after
both countries signed the Algiers Peace Agreement in 2000 and agreed to resolve the
boundary dispute that gave rise to the two year war (1998-2000) and the claims arising from
the conflict.
104. Thomas Buergenthal. Dinner Speech by Judge Thomas Buergenthal. in FROM
GOVERNMENT TO GOVERNANCE: THE GROWING IMPACT OF NON-STATE ACTORS ON THE
INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN LEGAL SYSTEM. PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIXTH HAGUE JOINT
CONFERENCE HELD IN THE HAGUE. THE NETHERLANDS 3-5 JULY 2003, 258 (Wybo. P. Heere
ed., 2004).
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hoc dispute settlement bodies. 0 5 But there are also specific reasons that
influence State's choice for such forums. The following two major reasons
broadly explain the proliferation of ad hoe dispute settlement mechanisms.
B. Ad hoc Tribunals in Response to Emergency Situations
Not many countries have subscribed to the compulsory jurisdiction of
the ICJ. In December 2005, the number of countries which have made such
declaration stand at sixty-six. The same story applies to other treaty based
dispute settlement bodies. Nor are countries that have not yet made the
policy determination to appear before the ICJ prepared to make a one time
declaration to use its services for a particular case unless they have earlier
negotiated a treaty to that effect. Yet conflicts happen without due notice
and these conflicts need a settlement, even after a deadly war. A cursory
look at the pending and earlier cases before the Permanent Court of
Arbitration shows that at least one of the countries if not both have not
accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ, a fact which, among others,
plays an important role for resort to an ad hoc dispute settlement
mechanism. °6  Hence the resort to claims commissions and ad hoc
arbitrations is sometimes an emergency measure as the parties in dispute
were not prepared for it in advance.
In the field of international criminal law, major decisions such as the
establishment of the Nuremberg Tribunal, the ICTY, and the ICTR were
likewise made under difficult circumstances when the international
community could not afford the luxury of negotiating a permanent
international tribunal or modifying the existing ones to fit the purpose. As
Abi-Saab rightly notes, international law is not always made in a "cool
headed way"; its development is usually precipitated by crises and
atrocities, through decisions taken hastily and under great pressure. 107 He
further argues that international law and its institutions by implication, has
to develop like a parasitic plant by seizing on all opportunities and latching
onto anything that gives it the possibility of moving upwards towards the
light. 0 8 Even if these ad hoc attempts to establish international criminal
tribunals paved the way for a permanent international criminal court, it is
105. Though doubts have been expressed as to whether arbitration is as cost-effective
and expedient as it is thought to be, the general perception remains that it is.
106. Examples of disputes include those between Guyana/Suriname (Guyana has not
accepted): Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago (Trinidad and Tobago has not accepted):
lreland/UK (Ireland has not accepted); and Ethiopia/Eritrea (both have not accepted). Earlier
cases include disputes between Malaysia/Singapore (neither has accepted);
Netherlands/France (France has not accepted); Eritrea/Yemen (neither has accepted).
107. Georges Abi-Saab, Fragmentation or Unification: Some Concluding Remarks, 31
N.Y.U. J. INTL L. & POL. 919, 930 (1999).
108. Id. at 931.
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not yet the time to rule out ad hoc international criminal courts in the
future. '09
C. Selectivity Prompted by Domestic Priorities
The other reason why States opt for ad hoc dispute settlement
mechanisms in preference over permanent courts and tribunals has to do
with forces within the domestic politics. Often foreign polices of states and
their attitude towards international dispute settlement is determined by the
prevailing domestic political attitudes. Among others, a choice for
settlement of disputes in an ad hoc fashion is partly an outcome of the
compromise reached between the proponents and the opponents of a more
general and permanent international court. The attitude of a state towards a
world court is not only shaped by the struggle between the legislative and
the executive branch of governments. 110 Thomas Franck discusses this
struggle in the context of the United States' attitude towards the world court
since the League of Nations. III According to him:
[P]olicy has always been the product of an inconclusive struggle
between two contradictory national tendencies: the messianic and
the chauvinist. The messianics and chauvinists both start from the
assumption that the United States is uniquely successful living
experiment in resolving conflict between governments (state and
federal) and between political institutions (Congress and the
Presidency) by recourse to laws and courts. From this common
assumption, however, they derive diametrically opposed
prescriptive theories. The messianic believe that what has worked
so well for the Republic succeed in a world community. More
broadly, America's Messianic are moved by a missionary vision,
seeking national security by the conversion of others to their ways.
The chauvinists, on the other hand, believe that American
Experience is unique, held in place by the social cement of our
people's shared values. To extrapolate these uniquely American
ideas and institutions is to risk diluting and undermining them. 112
109. The fact that the United States, which is the sole super power, is violently opposed
to the International Criminal Court is an indication that other forms of international criminal
justice are not decisively off the table yet. The United States, as a champion of ad hoc
international criminal tribunals, has played a very important role in the establishment of
Nuremberg, ICTY and 1CTR.
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Hence, letting a court composed of outsiders decide on American
affairs is undesirable.
Christopher Pinto argues that the analysis by Professor Frank of the
impact of the domestic politics on the attitude towards international third
party dispute settlement in the United States could likewise be applied to
other members of the United Nations.11 3 However, the effect of the tension
between the chauvinists and the messianics, which he refers to as the reds
and the blues, respectively for want of less emotive expressions, is likely to
be felt most acutely where democratic forms of governance prevail. This
prevalent tendency explains not only why States sometimes reject appearing
before international courts, but it also explains why they choose to give their
support for the establishment of ad hoc forms of judicial forums which
involve less onerous obligation. We are here interested in the latter aspect.
The forces that are opposed to the idea of international court feel that it
is an ideal that lies far in the future and in the meantime the tension is
resolved on the basis of selectivity. This selectivity, however, in practice
has led to the creation of more judicial forums. Here, the selection is made
in favor of some issues on an ad hoc basis. In effect, such selectivity is able
to "appease moral strivings, while at the same time relieving practical
tensions of politics at the domestic level".' 1 Even if such is the case, in
most countries, the selectivity option has real meaning and value for the
powerful and affluent states since it is they who may contemplate a regular
substantial allocation of funds to maintain a new institution for settling
disputes. This particularly explains the manner in which ad hoc
international criminal courts are encouraged and established at the
insistence of some countries, instead of pushing for a permanent
international court. Even after the Rome Statute entered into force there
were indications towards keeping the piecemeal approaches to certain crisis
situations. The suggestion made by the U.S. regarding the handling of the
Sudanese crisis is a case in point. Augmenting the resources of the already
existing judicial forums and empowering them to deal with new issues
implies "a more generalized commitment that could prove inconvenient,
expensive and difficult to justify domestically and as a result a government
should pursue a course that is more selective and responsive to the
situation."' 1 5 This tendency "has led to ...mixed arbitral tribunals or
recourse to cooperatively maintained (and therefore relatively low cost)
specialized arbitration centers." 116
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In addition to lessening the financial implications and tension in
domestic politics, "[t]he newness of the institution would also allow certain
flexibility through freedom from traditions and practices of an earlier time,
which the initiators might consider inappropriate to the expeditious
achievement of their political objectives." 117 Financially, there is an anxiety
associated with the continuous funding of ad hoc criminal tribunals which
take longer to complete their job than originally contemplated. There also
appears a 'tribunal fatigue' among the UN member States for establishing
more ad hoc tribunals. 118 Again politicians are prepared to face the lesser
of the two evils.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Several reasons are invoked for the creation of multiple international
courts and tribunals. An attempt has been made in this essay to examine
these reasons from varying perspectives. The first of these perspectives is
to look at why States choose not to use the already existing International
Court of Justice. While some of the reasons in this category are justified,
the others are based on mere perceptions that are not supported empirically.
In addition to a historical and functional consideration for choosing
alternative international judicial forums, the fundamental structural changes
in international law and relations at the end of the Cold War has its role to
play in the multiplicity of these forums. The relative success of early
regional courts is also believed to have inspired the replication of similar
tribunals in the other regions.
It has also been shown that one of the features of modern international
dispute settlement mechanisms is the prevalence of ad hoc forms of dispute
settlement bodies. This in turn finds its justification, among others, in the
desire of the international community, notably through the United Nations
Security Council, to swiftly respond to emergency situations. This ad hoc
response is also explained as a consequence of a domestic politics that
projects itself in how States make their policy decisions at the international
level.
The desire to establish more international courts and tribunals has not
abated despite the repeated suggestions from influential figures such as the
former ICJ presidents who made successive calls to the members of the
United Nations in their annual reports. Yet, in at least one region of the
world, Africa, there is a serious attempt to merge the African Court of
Justice, modeled after the European Court of Justice, with the African Court
117. Id. at 473.
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of Human and Peoples Rights'. Though the move is not primarily prompted
by the desire to coherently apply international law, one will have to wait to
see whether this endeavor will bear fruit and whether other regions are
prepared to follow suit.
